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There is no doubt that protectionism costs. But it is less clear exactly how
much it costs and who pays.' And while protectionism results in a
deadweight loss-there are more losers than winners-some individuals and
groups gain from protectionism. And it is those who stand to gain who have
the ear of the legislature, at least for the most part.
Part I of this article provides an overview of protectionism and the costs
associated with it. Part III examines the monetary costs of protectionism,
with emphasis on the costs of protectionism in the auto, steel, textile and
agricultural industries. Part IV discusses the nonmonetary costs associated
with protectionism, such as unemployment, reduction in social harmony,
reduced choice and rights violations. Part V concludes that protectionism is
a bad policy, whether viewed from a utilitarian or rights perspective, and
recommends that laws that support protectionism should be repealed because
protectionism is not in the public interest.
H. OVERVIEW
Protectionism can take several forms. Protectionism in the form of quotas
limits the number of units of the foreign product that can come into the
country. Tariffs are another form of protectionism, which can be used to
raise the price to consumers, thereby reducing the price competition on
domestic producers that would otherwise result. One study estimates that
trade restrictions raise the cost of imported goods by 20%, on average, and
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1 One informative treatment of this question is by Tracey Horton and Hal Colebatch, Who
Pays for Protection, AusTL. INsT. FOR PUB. PoL'Y, Policy Paper No. 13 (1988).
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raise the price of comparable domestically produced goods by 10% to 14%
because of the reduced price competition.2 Curiously, slapping quotas on
foreign producers gives them an incentive to upgrade the quality of the units
they can send into the country and encourages them to build plants in the
United States, thus increasing competition with the very companies the
government is trying to protect.'
A study of 203 International Trade Commission investigations in five
industries between 1972-82 concluded that protection is not an effective way
to stimulate domestic output because the reactions of users tend to offset the
actions of producers.4 Other studies have reached similar conclusions.'
This evidence makes it difficult to justify even the most plausible excuse for
protectionism-the infant industry argument.
Baldwin and Green found that trade policy changes that enable industries
to get import protection sooner and easier than before make it easier for
foreign suppliers to avoid reducing exports to the protected market.
Governments find it easier to place quantitative restrictions on imports from
a few foreign suppliers rather than from all foreign suppliers. But restric-
tions lead to quality upgrades, a shifting of production to noncontrolled
countries, and a rise in exports by suppliers that are not controlled, all of
which tend to offset the purpose of the protection-to expand domestic
output. When government defines an industry narrowly in order to show
serious injury from imports, users and foreign suppliers shift to substitute
items, which defeats the purpose of the protection.6
Another problem with protectionism is that temporary measures, designed
to help an ailing industry strengthen itself to compete in international
markets, tend to become permanent. Industries that are relieved of the
2 Alan Murray, As Free-Trade Bastion, U.S. Isn't Half as Pure as Many People Think,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1985, at 1.
3 Jose A. Gomez-Ivanez et al., Restraining Auto Imports: Does Anyone Win?, 2 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 196 (1983).
*4 Robert E. Baldwin & Richard K. Green, The Effects of Protection on Domestic Output,
in TRADE POLICY ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 196, 223 (Robert E. Baldwin ed., 1988).
5 A Congressional Budget Office Study concluded that "... protection has not
substantially improved the ability of domestic firms to compete with foreign producers."
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HAS TRADE PROTECTION REVITALIZED DOMESTIC
INDUSTRIES? 96 (1986), quoted in Protectionism's Adverse Economic Impact, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, Investigation No. 332-325 4 (Oct. 14, 1992) (written testimony of Daniel Oliver,
former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
6 Baldwin & Green, supra note 4, at 223-24.
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pressures of competition sometimes choose to use their resources to convince
the legislature to renew protection of their industry rather than investing in
cost reduction because the profits from protectionism might be higher and
more sure than the profits from competition.!
Granting subsidies is also a form of protectionism, in the broad sense,
because it reduces a domestic producer's risk and/or increases profits.
Regulations can reduce competition and protect domestic producers from
foreign competition if the regulation has the effect of raising barriers to
market entry. According to one estimate, regulation costs Americans
between $400-$500 billion annually-about $4,000 to $5,000 per house-
hold-in addition to the costs that appear in the government budget.8
Not all regulations can be classified as protectionist, however, although
many of them do have a protectionist effect. Sometimes two or more of
these forms of protectionism may be used in conjunction with each other,
which makes it difficult to calculate the exact cost and benefit of each
policy. One study estimated that the annual cost of protection in industries
with trade volumes exceeding $100 million in the mid-1980s was $65
billion.9  William Niskanen also estimates that trade protection cost
American consumers about $65 billion in 1986, which represents almost a
100% increase since 1980.0 Another study estimated that trade protection-
ism cost consumers $80 billion in 1988." But these studies understate the
true cost of protectionism, because they exclude the effect that the filing of
antidumping petitions have on prices. The mere filing of an antidumping
petition, or the threat of filing, induces firms to raise their prices, which costs
consumers. There is tremendous incentive-and no downside risk-to file
such a petition because it is a tool (weapon) that a company can use to force
a competitor to raise its prices without any cost to the firm that files, because
Aaron Tomell, On the Ineffectiveness of Made-to-Measure Protectionist Programs, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 66, 66-79 (Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin eds.,
1991).
8 THoMAs D. HOPKINS, COST Op REGULATION 1 (Rochester Institute of Technology
Public Policy Working Paper, 1991).
9 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE
STUDIES 14-15 (1986).
'0 William A. Niskanen, U.S. Trade Policy, REGULATION 34, 34-42 (No. 3, 1988).
" Paul Blustein, Unfair Traders: Does the U.S. Have Room To Talk?, WASH. POST, May
24, 1989, at Fl.
1993]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the federal government pays the cost of prosecution."
Another factor that is often overlooked is the disparate impact that
protectionism has on subgroups. Trade restrictions on automobiles, clothing,
and sugar cost consumers $14 billion in 1984, which amounted to a 23%
income tax surcharge for families that had less than $10,000 in income, but
amounted to only 3% for families with incomes over $60,000.' Protection
in the textile industry alone has been estimated to cost poor families almost
9% of their disposable income. 4 Another study found that textile quotas
cost the poorest fifth of the U.S. population 3.6% of their incomes, compared
to 0.3% for the top fifth." Protectionist trade policies also tend to harm
developing countries more than developed countries. One study found the
average tariff on manufactured products coming into the United States from
developed countries to be 2.9%, whereas the rate for products coming from
developing countries averaged 7.6%. 16
"Costs" of protectionism include not only direct costs, such as higher
prices, but many indirect costs as well. Protectionism destroys more jobs
than it creates, so there is the employment cost. 7 Quality may also decline,
if higher quality products become less available or totally unavailable as a
result of protectionism. In addition, there are losses of individual rights,
since consumers and producers-buyers and sellers-are less free to enter
into contracts. There is also a cost involved in administering the various
protectionist schemes, which must be paid for by taxpayers and consumers.
Finally, since protectionism raises prices, reduces quality and incurs
administrative costs, it reduces the general standard of living.
12 Thomas J. Prusa, Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?, 33 J. INT'L
ECON. 1, 4-5 (1992).
13 Susan Hickok, The Consumer Cost of U.S. Trade Restraints, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y. Q. REv., Summer 1985, at 1-12.
14 James Bovard, High Cost of Textile Protection, J. COMM., Dec. 10, 1991, at A12. Also
cited in Oliver, supra note 5, at 7.
's Oliver, supra note 5, at 7 (citing Peter Passell, The Victim Has a Blue Collar, But Free
Trade Has an Alibi, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1992, at E4). For a detailed breakdown of how
textile protectionism affects different income groups, see WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE FUTuRE
OF WORLD TRADE IN TExTrs AND APPAREL 201-06 (1990).
16 Oliver, supra note 5, at 7 (citing J. MICHAEL FINGER & PATRICK A. MEssERLIN, THE
EFFEC-s OF INDusTRIAL COUNTRIES' POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (1989)).




The next few paragraphs summarize the cost of protectionism in various
major industries.
A. Autos
According to a Brookings Institution study, voluntary export restrictions
on autos cost consumers about $14 billion in 1984, while auto manufacturers
gained $9 billion in profits, for a deadweight loss of $5 billion."8 Because
the quantity of foreign autos coming into the United States was crimped, unit
prices rose by nearly a third, according to one estimate. 9 Also, because
foreign auto prices were higher than would be the case in a free market,
domestic auto manufacturers were able to raise their prices because of
reduced price competition from imports.2' Other sources report the mid-
1980s figure at $17 billion.2' This figure includes the increased cost of
new foreign and domestic cars as a result of quotas.22 More recent studies
have estimated the U.S deadweight loss attributable to quotas to be between
Is CLIFFORD WINsToN ET AL., BLIND INTERSECTION? POLICY AND THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY 65-66 (1987). This study is summarized in Hopkins, supra note 8, at B8-9.
'9 Elias Dinopoulos & Mordechai E. Kreinin, Effects of the U.S.-Japan Auto VER on
European Prices and on U.S. Welfare, 70 R. ECON. & STAT. 484, 484-91 (1988). The
authors also found that the U.S. welfare loss to Europe exceeded its loss to Japan.
" Id. at 485. The authors found that the European auto manufacturers that sold cars in
the United States raised their prices at the same time that the United States placed import
quotas on Japanese cars.
21 New Competitive Realities Show Japanese Auto Quota Is Obsolete, WORLDWIDE INFO.
REsouRcEs, Nov. 27, 1987, at 4.
2 One factor these studies often do not consider is the effect upgrading has on consumer
welfare. For example, in response to quotas, Japan increased the size, horsepower and luxury
equipment of the autos it sent to the United States. These changes added $1,500 to the cost
of the average Japanese car, but some studies ignored this factor when estimating the cost of
quotas. Robert C. Feenstra, How Costly is Protectionism?, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 167 (1992)
[hereinafter Feenstra, How Costly]; Robert C. Feenstra, Quality Change Under Trade
Restraints in Japanese Autos, 103 Q. J. ECON. 131, 131-46 (1988) [hereinafter Feenstra,
Quality Change]. It has been estimated that upgrading from basic steel to specialty steel as
a result of quotas caused as much consumer loss as did the conventional deadweight loss.
Randi Boorstein & Robert C. Feenstra, Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in U.S. Steel
Imports, 1969-74, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 167, 167-86 (Elhanan
Helpman & Assaf Razin eds., 1991).
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$200 million and $1.2 billion.' Quota rents-the amount by which foreign
sellers can raise prices because of the quota-have been estimated to be
between $2.2 billion and $7.9 billion a year. 4
The foreign deadweight loss of U.S. auto quotas has been estimated to be
somewhere between zero and $3 billion.' It is reasonable to expect that
some foreign deadweight loss will occur, since the quantity they can sell will
be reduced by quotas, even though they may be able to charge a higher unit
price for the units they are able to sell. But these deadweight losses may be
on the conservative side because they do not take other inefficiency factors
into account. For example, when a company chooses what to export, it
might tend to choose to produce the product it can make most efficiently.
But when a quota causes a manufacturer to upgrade, as is the case with auto
and steel products, the company will have to shift its production from what
it can do most efficiently to something else which, by definition, it must do
less efficiently.7, These efficiency losses are difficult to estimate, but
probably exist.
Various other studies have also calculated the cost of protection in the
U.S. auto industry from different perspectives. The annual cost of tariffs on
vans and two- and four-door sports/utility vehicles has been estimated to be
$250 million." Japan's voluntary quotas on exports to the United States
were estimated to cost consumers $16.75 billion annually a few years ago.'
Another study estimated the annual cost of Japanese export quotas to exceed
J aime de Melo & David Tarr, Welfare Costs of U.S. Quotas in Textiles, Steel and
Autos, 72 REv. ECON. & STAT. 489, 489-97 (1990). Also reported in Feenstra, How Costly,
supra note 22, at 163.
' De Melo & Tarr, supra note 23; C. FRED BEROSTEN ET AL., AUCION QUOTAS AND
UNrrED STATES TRADE PoucY 42 (1987).
2s Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 169.
2 Carlos A. Rodriguez, The Quality of Imports and the Differential Welfare Effects of
Tariffs, Quotas, and Quality Controls as Protective Devices, 12 CAN. J. ECON. 439, 439-49
(1979); Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 168.
27 AMERICAN INT'L AUTO DEALERS' Ass'N, AUTO IMPORT GROUPS CALL RECLASSIFICA-
TION OF MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLES A "CONSUMER RIP-OFF ' (1989); AMERICAN INT'L AUTO
DEALERS' ASS'N, IMPORT DEALERS SEE CONTINUING FIGHT OVER MPV TARIFFS: DEMAND
END OF 25% DUTY (1989).
n CHARLES COLLYNS & STEVEN DUNAWAY, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE
COST OF TRADE RESTRAINTS: THE CASE OF JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE EXPORTS TO THE
UNITED STATES 150-75 (1987). This study covered the period 1981 to 1984.
534 [Vol. 23:529
19931 COST OF PROTECTIONISM
$1.1 billion.29
On a cost per auto basis, one study estimated that import quotas added an
average of $2,400 to the price of an average Japanese car.30 A different
study found the figure to be between $750 and $1,000.31 One study
determined that the annual cost of quotas was $241,235 per auto job
saved.32 Another study put the estimate at between $181,000 and $188,000,
depending on the year.33 A study of the effect that the voluntary export
restraint (VER) program had on Japanese cars for 1983 estimated the cost
per job saved to be at least $1,444,267.' But even if the annual cost of
saving one job in the auto industry is only $100,000, it would still pay, in
29 DAVID G. TARR & MORRIS E. MORKRE, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, AGGREGATE COSTS
To THE UNITED STATES OF TARIFFS AND QuOTAS ON IMPORTS: GENERAL TARIFF CUTS AND
REMOVAL OF QUOTAS ON AUTOMOBILES, STEEL, SUGAR AND TEXTILES 8 (1984). This study
was also cited in HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 256-58.
30 Robert W. Crandall, The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection for Autos and Steel, 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcrlvrrY 271, 271-88 (1987). Reduction in the supply of
Japanese autos entering the United States allowed auto manufacturers to raise prices. It
should be mentioned that the United States is not the only country that tries to protect its auto
industry. South Korea is even more protectionist. An American car with a base price of
$16,000 costs South Korean consumers about $43,000 by the time its government gets done
adding on tariffs and taxes. Pete du Pont, Tigers by the Tail, AM. SPECTATOR, Sept. 1992,
at 41.
3 Robert Crandall, supra note 30. Since the price of Japanese autos was artificially raised
because of a crimp in the supply, domestic auto makers could raise their prices because of
reduced price competition.
32 TARR & MORKRE, supra note 29 (computed by dividing the total cost of protection by
the estimated number of jobs saved by protection). Other studies computed different costs
per job saved, depending on the year in question and the specific piece of legislation being
considered. Crandall estimated the 1983 cost to be $160,000 per job saved. Robert W.
Crandall, Import Quotas and the Automobile Industry: The Costs of Protectionism,
BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1984, at 8, 16. HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 258 (estimated the
1984 cost to be $105,000).
33 Dinopoulos & Kreinin, supra note 19, at 490 (figures computed by dividing the average
labor productivity (output/labor) ratio into the VER-induced additional auto output).
34 Michael F. Bryan and Owen F. Humpage, Voluntary Export Restraints: The Cost of
Building Walls, in ECON. REv., at 17-37 (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Summer 1984).
This estimate is conservative for several reasons. While it estimated the VER program
transferred about $2 billion from consumers to producers and dealers and generated $166.4
million in efficiency losses, it did not consider secondary price effects, such as the price rise
for substitute cars. In addition, the number of jobs saved by the policy was estimated to be
1,500 at most. If the number of jobs saved had been only 1,000, then the cost per job saved
would have been $2,166,400, without taking secondary effects into account.
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terms of overall welfare, to remove the blockages to free trade and
compensate each displaced auto worker $40,000 or $50,000 a year for a
while,3" until they can find another job. One study of import restraints in
the European auto industry concludes that: "The effects of quantitative
import restrictions on the behavior of firms in a market as imperfectly
competitive as the car market seem likely to be of sufficient magnitude to
make such restrictions an expensive and inefficient form of policy interven-
tion.' '
B. Steel
A study of the pre-1985 restraint agreement with the European Community
estimated that the induced increase in the price of imported steel was
30%.37 This study also estimated that the induced increase in the price of
domestic steel resulting from this agreement was 12%.31 Various studies 39
have estimated the cost of restraints to U.S. consumers to be $1.1 billion, 4'
$2.0 billion,4' or from $4.3 billion to $5.9 billion.42
Studies have estimated the U.S. deadweight loss due to import protection
to be between $100 million and $300 million a year.43 Quota rents from
steel industry protection have been estimated to be somewhere between $700
million and $2 billion a year." The annual foreign deadweight loss has
s Average annual compensation in the auto industry for the years in question was about
$35,000.
6 Alasdair Smith & Anthony J. Venables, Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export
Restraints in the European Car Market, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 187,
213-20 (Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin eds., 1991).
37 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 178-79. This figure represents a 5% tariff and a 25%
scarcity premium that resulted from the pre-1985 restraint agreement with the European
Community and the informal understanding with Japan.
Id. This estimate was based on the price rise associated with the crimp in supply that
resulted from restraint agreements.
39 For a summary of these studies, see id. at 179.
40 TARR AND MORKRE, supra note 29, at 25. This figure is for 1983.
41 Hickok, supra note 13, at 8. This figure is for 1984.
42 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 179. These figures are for 1983 and are based on a U.S.
Congressional Budget Office study that reflected the projected additional cost of the 15%
quota under the proposed Fair Trade in Steel Act.
43 de Melo and Tarr, supra note 23; Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliott, supra note 9. These
studies were also cited by Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 163.
4 de Melo and Tarr, supra note 23; BERGSTEN ET. AL., supra note 24, at 42.
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been estimated to be $100 million.45
Another cost, although more difficult to trace, is the cost protection in one
industry has on other industries. For example, if the steel industry receives
protection, steel-using industries have to pay more for their steel. A
government study of the effect of voluntary restraint agreements on steel
consuming industries estimated that the agreements caused sales in these
industries to decline by as much as $1.9 billion in 1985, $5 billion in 1986,
$4.8 billion in 1987 and $0.6 billion in 1988.' Foreign companies willing
to sell steel for lower prices are forced to raise their prices as a condition of
doing business in the United States. U.S. trade policies sometimes actually
increase the profits of foreign companies because the reduced quantity they
can sell is more than offset by the higher price they can charge. Korean
steel companies would actually make less profit if the United States removed
its trade restrictions,47 which puts the U.S. Congress in the curious position
of helping foreign companies competing with domestic producers.
Another phenomenon that occurs is the market mix shifts when a tariff or
quota places restraints on one product or another. For example, when quotas
were placed on the importation of basic steel, foreign producers increased
their shipments of specialty steel.48 Users of specialty steel had to keep
larger than usual inventories of specialty steel at the start of each quota
period because foreign suppliers surged to fill their country quota.49 Thus,
quotas increased users' holding costs because they were not able to manage
their inventories at optimum levels.
45 Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 163 (citing Randi Boorstein, The Effect of
Trade Restrictions on the Quality and Composition of Imported Products: An Empirical
Analysis of the Steel Industry (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University)).
'6 USITC Pub. 2182, Inv. No. 332-270, THE EFFECTS OF THE STEEL VOLUNTARY
RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS ON U.S. STEEL-CONSUMING INDUsTRiEs, at viii (1989). Another
estimate of steel-user costs for 1988 is $800 million. Janet Novack, Does Big Steel Really
Need Protection?, FORBES, March 16, 1992, at 37.
4 David Taff, Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea to the
United States and the European Economic Community, 1 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 379-418
(1987); J. Michael Finger, Trade Policies in the United States, in NATIONAL TRADE POLICIES
79 (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1992).
4 Quality upgrading is a common phenomenon when a tariff or quota is placed on certain
items. For a study on quality upgrading as applied to the steel industry, see Randi Boorstein
and Robert C. Feenstra, Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in U.S. Steel Imports, 1969-
74, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 168-86 (Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin
eds., 1991).
4 Baldwin and Green, supra note 4, at 212.
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Interindustry shifts can occur as well. For example, if government
restricts steel imports, the price of steel will rise. Domestic consumers will
then tend to buy foreign-made autos, machinery, and equipment made with
lower-cost foreign steel. Business will thus be taken away from domestic
producers of these items."
C. Textiles5'
One study conducted a few years ago estimated the induced increase in the
price of textiles to be 21%.52 A more recent study estimated the price
increase to be 28%."3 For apparel, various studies have estimated the cost
increase attributable to protectionism to be 39%,54 50%,5 46% to 76%,56
and 53%.5 The induced increase in the price of domestic goods has been
estimated to be between 3%5 and 17%' 9 for textiles and 19%,'
31%,61 or 46%62 for apparel. Figures differ among the studies because of
differing methodologies, assumptions, sample populations and years, but the
findings are consistent in their conclusions that protectionism results in
higher prices.
Various studies have placed the cost of restraints to U.S. consumers at
between $8.5 billion to $12.0 billion,' $18 billion" for apparel, and
' See Crandall, supra note 30, at 272.
S Some of the studies cited in this section are summarized in HUFEAUER, supra note 9,
at 146-48.
52 id. at 146.
53 WLIAM R. CUNE, TmE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TExTaLs AND APPAREL 15
(rev. ed. 1990).
HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 146.
5 CARL HAMILTON, AN ASSEsSMENT OF VOLUNTARY RESTRAINDs ON HONG KONG
EXPORTS TO EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. 8 (1985). A similar paper was published by Carl
Hamilton under the same title in 53 ECONOMICA 339-50 (1986).
56 Hickok. supra note 13, at 6.
5 CLINE, supra note 53, at 15.
Id. at 191.
HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 146.
6 CUNE, supra note 53, at 191.
61 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 146.
62 Carl Hamilton, Voluntary Export Restraints on Asia: Tariff Equivalents, Rents and
Trade Barrier Formation 8 (1984) (unpublished Seminar Paper 276, Institute for International
Economic Studies, University of Stockholm).
6' Hickok, supra note 13, at 18-19.
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between $2.8 billion' and $9 billion for textiles.6 The annual welfare.
cost of restraints to the United States has been estimated to be $650 million
for textiles 7 and $6 billion for apparel." A more recent study estimated
that the annual welfare gains to be reaped by removing quantitative
restrictions on textiles and apparel will be $11.92 billion.' The same study
estimated foreign capture rents to be more than $6 billion. A study of trade
in fourteen key textile and apparel categories involving three developed and
thirty-four developing countries estimated the annual global gains to be had
by eliminating quotas and tariffs on developed country textile and apparel
imports will be approximately $23 billion, of which approximately $12.3
billion would accrue to the United States. 0 The distortional effect of the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which has been in place since 1974, is estimated
to be between $4-$6 billion a year.71 Protectionism costs between
$50,00072 and $134,686 7 a year for each textile job saved and between
$39,000 and $81,9737- for each apparel job saved.
Textile protection also results in deadweight losses to foreign producers
because quotas prevent them from selling the quantity that would be possible
to sell in a free market. One study estimates developing countries suffer $8
billion in losses because of the quotas and tariffs that the industrialized
countries place on textiles. 76 About half of this loss is attributable to the
HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 148. Cline also estimated the cost to be about $18 billion,
but at wholesale-which could understate the true (retail) cost by as much as 100%. CLINE,
supra note 53, at 192.
6 CLINE, supra note 53, at 192. Again, Cline estimates the wholesale cost.
66 HuBAuER, supra note 9, at 148.
67 Id. at 149.
68 Id.
' de Melo and Tarr, supra note 23, at 493.
7o Irene Trela and John Whalley, Global Effects of Developed Country Trade Restrictions
on Textiles and Apparel, 100 ECoN. J. 1190, 1194 (1990). This paper is a revised and
shortened version of Do Developing Countries Lose from the MFA? (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 2618, 1988), and both papers are discussed in
Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 167.
71 Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 164.
7 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 149.
7 CLINE, supra note 53, at 191.
7" HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 149.
75 CLINE, supra note 53, at 191.
76 Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 167.
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trade policy of the United States."
D. Agricultural Products
Although the various farm commodity programs had an annual deadweight
loss, according to one estimate, of about $6 billion in 1987,78 some did gain
from the programs. While consumers lost $4.8 billion and taxpayers lost
$17.7 billion, producers gained $16.6 billion. About $4.1 billion of the $4.8
billion consumer loss represents income redistribution as the result of
regulation. Another study estimated the subsidies to farm programs, and
peripheral programs such as the food stamp program, had an annual net
deadweight loss of $31 billion as of the mid-1980s. These programs cost
consumers and taxpayers $6.9 billion and $32.1 billion, respectively, and
resulted in producer gains of $8.0 billion.79
1. Dairy
Milk marketing order programs in the United States redistribute about
$500 million a year from consumers to producers. However, the deadweight
loss is smaller than that because there are some producer gains that partially
offset the cost. Exact estimates are difficult because of the cross effect of
import quotas and price supports, which are estimated to produce $1.3 billion
in annual producer gains, while costing consumers and taxpayers $1.2 billion
and $800 million a year, respectively. s°
One study of the dairy industry estimated the annual U.S. deadweight loss
caused by protectionism to be $1.4 billion.8 l Another study estimated that
the quota rents in the dairy industry cost $250 million a year.82 A study
from the mid-1980s found that there is a small amount of foreign deadweight
7 id.
' Bruce L. Gardner, The United States, in AGRICULTURAL PRorECrONIsM IN THE
INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD 52 (Fred H. Sanderson ed., 1990).
79 CLIFTON B. LUrRELL, THE HIGH COST OF FARM WELFARE 121-22 (1989).
8o Gardner, supra note 78, at 49-50.
S1 HUFBAUER, supra note 9. Feenstra, How Costly, supra note 22, at 163-64, also cites
this figure. Feenstra mentions that most of this deadweight loss is due to restrictions on
cheese imports. Id.
82 Bergsten et al., supra note 24, at 42.
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loss from U.S. dairy industry protectionism. 83
2. Peanuts
One study concluded that peanut marketing quotas result in the transfer of
$140 million a year from American consumers to producers." Another
study put the cost of restraints to U.S. consumers at $200 million, which
amounts to $1,000 per acre."5 The price of both domestic and imported
peanuts is 28% higher than would be the case without quotas.86
3. Sugar
This "infant industry" has been protected by the United States government
since 1816 which, one would think, would be a sufficient amount of time for
the industry to become competitive. Instead, protection has allowed the
sugar industry to charge up to four times the world sugar price for domesti-
cally produced sugar."' Restrictions on the importation of sugar in 1987
cost American consumers between $2.1 and $3 billion. 8 The benefit to
domestic sugar producers was $1.7 billion.89 But because the sugar
restrictions stimulated corn sweeteners, there was an additional annual cost
to consumers of $1 billion, for a deadweight loss of $1.4 billion.' The
price of sugar became so high that both Coke and Pepsi decided to switch
to high fructose corn syrup, which caused U.S. sugar consumption to drop
by more than 500,000 tons a year, an amount that is equal to the entire
quotas of 25 of the 42 countries that are allowed to sell sugar in the United
83 James E. Anderson, The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas: The Cheese Case, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 178 (1985). He estimated the loss to be $20 million.
84 Gardner, supra note 78, at 49-50.
8 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 319.
Id. at 318.
87 JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 71 (1991). The farm program Congress
passed in 1985 guaranteed U.S. sugar beet and sugar cane farmers about 21.5 cents a pound
for their product when the world market price was about 4 cents a pound. Janet Novack,
Three Yards and a Cloud of (Sugar) Dust, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 39.
'" Gardner, supra note 78, estimated the cost to be $2.1 billion. A Commerce Department
study estimated the cost to be $3 billion. RALPH IVES & JOHN HURLEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE v (1988). This latter study was cited by BOVARD, supra note 87, at 72.
"9 Since 1980, the U.S. sugar program has cost taxpayers and consumers more than $2
million for each domestic sugar producer. BOVARD, supra note 87, at 71.
9o Gardner, supra note 78, at 47.
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States.9
Another study estimated that protectionism causes the price of both
domestic and imported sugar to increase by 30%.' The cost of constraints
to U.S. consumers has also been estimated to be $660 million (1978), 9' $1
billion (1981 quotas),9 $1.7 billion (1980 tariffs), 95 $2.4 billion
(FY1983),9 $1.88 billion (FY1983),97 $735 million (1983), 9' $1 billion
(1984),9 $3 billion ( 19 8 4 ),100 and $3 billion plus (1988).'o' The quota
rents that foreigners reap from sugar protectionism has been estimated to be
between $410 million °2 and $1.3 billion."
Trade barriers in the sugar industry cause other economic distortions as
well. For example, some sugar farmers in the Caribbean and other third
world countries switched to growing marijuana because U.S. trade barriers
9' BOVARD, supra note 87, at 72-73.
HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 294.
Robert W. Crandall, Federal Government Initiatives to Reduce the Price Level, 2
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Acrivrry 401, 431 (1978).
9 CONSUMERS FOR WoRLD TRADE, CWT INFO. PAPER, How MucH DO CONSUMERS PAY
FOR U.S. TRADE BARRIERS? (1984).
"MIcHAEL C. MUNGER, THE CosTs OF PROTECTIONISM: ESTIMATES OF THE HIDDEN TAx
OF TRADE RESRANT 10, 14 (Washington University Center for the Study of American
Business Working Paper No. 80, 1983).
96 ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 478,
SUGAR: BACKGROUND FOR 1985 LEGISLATION 38 (1984).
'3Rachel Dardis & Carol Young, The Welfare Loss from the New Sugar Program, 19 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 163, 169 (1985).
"TARR & MORKRE, supra note 29, at 76. HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 297, points out
that this is a conservative estimate because it is based on a long-run analysis in which the
world sugar price is assumed to be 15 cents per pound, when in fact the 1983 world price was
9.4 cents per pound.
Hickok, supra note 13, at 7.
0oEstimated cost of import quotas and price supports to consumers, according to Paul
Mirsky, president of Sugar Refiners, Inc., Sugar Refiners Criticize Policy on Quotas, Prices,
J. COMM., May 21, 1985, at A15.
102 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNrED STATES SUGAR POUCY: AN ANALYSIS 23
(1988), cited in BOvARD, supra note 87, at 72.
102 BERGSTEN ET AL, supra note 24, at 42.
103 Gwo-Jiun M. Leu et al., Gains and Losses of Sugar Program Policy Options, 69 AM.
J. AGRIC. ECON. 591, 597. These authors also estimated the annual foreign deadweight loss
to be $200 million. Id. at 596.
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prevented them from selling sugar in the United States."°4 So it might be
valid to add a portion of the costs of policing U.S. borders to keep out
marijuana to the more direct costs of subsidizing the domestic sugar industry
in the U.S. In addition, domestic sugar refineries are hurt because they are
not able to buy cheaper foreign raw sugar. Those refineries that can survive
in this environment by being more efficient than their competitors are able
to increase their market share by buying up the refineries that go bankrupt
because of U.S. sugar policy, thus making the refinery end of the business
more monopolistic and less competitive. Between 1980 and mid-1989, ten
of the twenty-two U.S. sugar cane refineries have gone out of business.1°
4. Tobacco
One study estimated that tobacco marketing quotas results in $600 million
in annual producer gains and $600 million in consumer losses-$400 million
for U.S. consumers and $200 million for foreign consumers."
The point of citing all these statistics is not to show that different
economists arrive at different numbers,1°7 or that the numbers change from
one year to the next, but to illustrate that there is clear and convincing
evidence to show that protectionism costs, and costs plenty, in monetary
terms. But protectionism involves more than just monetary costs.
IV. NONMONETARY COSTS
A. Employment Costs
Protectionist policies can save jobs. In fact, one of the main reasons why
advocates of protectionism support protection is because jobs will be lost in
the absence of protection. That is what is seen. But what is not seen is the
jobs that will be destroyed or the jobs that will never be created as the result
of some protectionist policy. If auto imports are restricted, the people who
'0' Paul Magnusson, U.S. Shoots Self in the Foot in Tariff Skirmish, DET. FREE PRESS,
May 24, 1987, at Fl, F7, cited in Oliver, supra note 5, at 8. BOvARD, supra note 87, at 74,
also mentions this point.
105 Novack, supra note 87, at 39-40.
106 Gardner, supra note 78, at 50.
107 The authors of these studies used a number of different techniques, methodologies,
assumptions, data, and demand and supply elasticities to arrive at their conclusions.
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depend on auto imports for their livelihood, such as importers, foreign car
dealers and their employees, and so forth, may be thrown into the unemploy-
ment lines. But the effects on these groups are often ignored when
computing the number of jobs to be saved by a particular protectionist
policy.
One of the problems with protectionism is that protectionists look at only
one side of the coin-the jobs that will be saved by adopting a particular
protectionist policy. It is more difficult to see the jobs that will be destroyed
or the jobs that will never be created by adopting the policy. Adopting the
correct policy is also complicated by the fact that the special interest
groups-the auto companies and auto unions, or whatever-have much to
gain or lose, and so are willing to expend more time, energy and resources
to get their policies adopted, than the average consumer, who may not even
be aware that a particular policy might cost a few hundred or a few thousand
dollars. The special interest groups are organized, whereas consumers are
not. Thus, the special interests have a built-in advantage. The special
interests can organize to get government to pass protectionist policies that
will benefit them at the expense of the general public. Public Choice
economists call this behavior rent-seeking, which they define as seeking
special privileges from government or getting others to pay for one sector's
benefits.'"8
It makes sense to expect that if consumers have to spend an extra $2,000
for an automobile, they will have $2,000 less to spend for other things. If
they have to pay more for autos, the industries that would otherwise receive
their $2,000 will receive less. If Jane has to spend $14,000 for a car instead
of $12,000, she will not be able to spend $2,000 on a vacation. So the
airline, hotel and restaurants that would otherwise get a portion of the $2,000
will be poorer as a result of the policy protecting the automobile industry
from foreign competition. And Jane will be $2,000 poorer too, because,
instead of having a car and a vacation, she has just a car.
It is impossible to predict which non-auto industries will be injured by the
protectionist policy, and it is unlikely that the average worker in the airline,
hotel or restaurant business will even be aware that they are being hurt by
the auto interests. But it is reasonable to expect that they are being hurt,
'0 For more on rent-seeking, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL
PRIvILEGE AND RENT SEEJuNG (1989); THE PoLTICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKIcNO (Charles
K. Rowley et al., eds., 1988); TOWARDS A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan, et al., eds., 1980).
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because the loss to these and other industries is substantial when one
multiplies the $2,000 welfare loss by the number of autos that are sold.
Billions of dollars that would otherwise be available to these other industries
becomes unavailable. As a result, these other industries will not expand as
rapidly--and thus will not create as many jobs-and may even have to fire
some employees because of reduced demand for their products and services.
Do the employment gains exceed the employment losses? Will a
protectionist policy save more jobs than it destroys? In the absence of
intervention, it is reasonable to expect that resources will gravitate to their
most productive uses. The price system is known for doing exactly that. An
intervention in the market process, such as the adoption of a protectionist
policy, distorts this flow into less productive areas, so it is reasonable to
expect that there will be some deadweight loss. The studies that have been
done confirm this expectation. For example, one study"° found that a
particular protectionist policy would save 36,000 apparel manufacturing jobs
but cause 58,000 apparel retailing jobs to be lost, for a loss/gain ratio of
more than 1.6 to 1. That figure is conservative, since it does not measure
the job losses that would occur in other industries as a result of the
protectionist policy. Other studies found that imposing "voluntary" export
restraints in the steel industry actually destroyed more jobs than it saved.
One study found that 16,900 jobs in the steel industry were gained as a
result of the 1984 voluntary restraints on steel imports, but 52,400 jobs were
destroyed in the industries that use steel, for a loss/gain ratio of 3.1 to 1.11
Another study' estimated that 27,072 jobs would be saved and 40,927
jobs would be lost, for a ratio of slightly more than 1.5 to 1. Another
study. 2 estimated that a 15% import quota in the steel industry would save
26,000 jobs in the steel industry but destroy 93,000 jobs in steel-importing
industries, for a loss/gain ration of 3.6 to 1. A recent study that estimated
the effects voluntary restraint agreements have had on 75 steel-using
industries concluded that the agreements destroyed 170,825 more jobs than
'09 I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECON: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE PoLMcS 54 n.40, 56 n.43 (1987).
"o ARTHUR DENZAU, How IMPORT REsTRAINTS REDUCE EMPLOYMENT (Washington
University Center for the Study of American Business Pub. No. 80, 1987).
n. Jose A. Mendez, The Short-Run Trade and Employment Effects of Steel Import
Restraints, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 554-64 (1986).
112 ARTHUR T. DENZAU, AMERICAN STEEL: RESPONDING TO FOREIGN COMPETMON
(Washington University Center for the Study of American Business Pub. No. 66, 1985).
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were saved.' The job gains occurred in industries that had lower value
added per worker. The industries that gained jobs had an average added
value of $32,400 per worker. The industries that lost jobs averaged $61,825
in added value, nearly twice as much." 4 So protectionism in the steel
industry is destroying relatively high quality jobs and replacing them with
relatively low quality jobs, which is just the opposite of what the protection-
ists would have us believe. Rather than blaming free trade for turning
Americans into a country of broom pushers and hamburger flippers,1 5 it
is protectionist policies that are causing high paying jobs to be replaced with
low paying jobs.
The Cline study" 6 estimated that the various protectionist policies in the
United States such as tariffs & quotas preserve 214,200 direct jobs in the
apparel industry and 20,700 jobs in the textile industry, at an annual cost of
$17.6 billion for apparel and $2.8 billion for textiles."" That means it
costs about $82,000 to save one job in the apparel industry for one year and
$135,000 to save a textile job. That amounts to $238 per household per
year, or 0.72% of household disposable income.'
The statistics in the sugar industry are especially shocking. Since 1980,
sugar quotas have destroyed more jobs than the total number of sugar
"' ARTHUR DENZAU, THE UNLEVE. PLAYING FIELD: HOW HIGH STEEL PRICES AND
TRADE PROTECTION HELP DEINDUSTRIALIZE AMERICA, 20 (Washington University Center for
the Study of American Business Working Paper No. 128, 1989). Industries that gained from
steel protection were: mining/petroleum, 13,569 jobs; wholesale/retail, 16,712; other, 7,523.
Industries that lost jobs were: manufacturing (nondurables), 14,896; manufacturing (durables),
128,813; construction, 50,607; services, 14,313.
"4 Id. at 22.
"1 Presidential candidate Walter Mondale, among others, warned that, unless America
adopts protectionist measures, the only jobs Americans will be able to get will be flipping
hamburgers at McDonald's or sweeping up around Japanese computers. JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
PROTECTIONISM 64 (1988).
116 CLINE, supra note 53, at 15.
',Id. at 193. It should be pointed out that the Cline figures are based on wholesale
prices. If these figures were converted to retail prices, the numbers could be as much as
100% higher, since the markup in the retail end of the business is about 100%. Whether
these numbers should be doubled, though, depends on what percentage of the profit margin
can be passed on to consumers, since, in the absence of protection, the increased competition
might force some sellers to reduce their profit margins in order to compete. It would be
reasonable to expect that the actual numbers, at retail, would be somewhat higher than the
wholesale numbers that Cline reports, but perhaps not 100% higher.
"' Id. at 15, 193.
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farmers in the United States."1 9 According to a Commerce Department
estimate, high sugar prices destroyed nearly 9,000 jobs in the food manufac-
turing industry since 1981. One company-Brach Candy Com-
pany-announced plans to close its candy factory in Chicago and move
3,000 jobs to Canada because of the high cost of U.S. sugar. Ten sugar
refineries had to close in recent years-thus destroying 7,000 refinery
jobs-because of cutbacks in sugar imports. But the United States has just
11,000 sugar farmers, 120 who received an average of more than $2 million
each in price supports and subsidies since 1980.121
In the next few paragraphs, I will attempt to estimate the cost of
protectionist trade policies in terms of the net number of jobs lost. These
estimates are based on an expansion and extrapolation of the studies reported
by Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliott, who looked at 31 cases of protectionism
in industries having at least $100 million in annual trade volume.122 In
cases where they conducted more than one study of the same industry, I will
use the statistics from their most recent study.
Employment losses are conservative for several reasons. For one, only
industries with volume of at least $100 million are included; smaller
industries are excluded. Also, in cases where the cost per job saved was
expressed by Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliott in terms such as "over one
million," as was the case for benzenoid chemicals, my computations were
based on the figure at the low end of the spectrum ($1 million). Finally, in
computing the number of jobs lost in each category, I used the more
conservative 1.6 to 1 ratio from the Baughman and Emrich study rather than
the much larger 3.1 to 1 ratio cited in the Denzau paper.
Table 1 estimates the jobs saved by protectionism. Statistics for the total
cost to consumers and cost per job saved were taken from Hufbauer, Berliner
and Elliott. Jobs saved was computed by dividing cost to consumers by
cost per job saved.
Table 2 estimates the jobs lost by protectionism and the deadweight loss.
The "jobs saved" and "cost per job saved" columns are taken from Table 1.
The column showing the ratio of jobs lost to jobs saved was taken from the
Baughman and Emrich study. Jobs lost is computed by multiplying "jobs
saved" by the ratio of jobs lost to jobs saved. "Deadweight Loss" is
" BOVARD, supra note 87, at 75.
"0 Id. at 75-76.
121 Id. at 71.
122 HUFBAUER, supra note 9, at 14-15.
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computed by subtracting jobs saved from jobs lost.
Table 1


























































































One point comes to mind immediately when looking at Table 1. When
looking at the "Cost Per Job Saved" column, it becomes immediately clear
that the cost of saving jobs in some industries is extremely high. In the
benzenoid chemical industry, for example, protectionism costs more than $1
million per job saved, whereas wages per employee averaged only about
$14.90 per hour for the period under study." That's about $29,800 a
year, based on a 2,000 hour work year. So if it costs exactly $1 million to
save a $29,800 job, it seems that it would be a better use of resources just
to pay laid-off workers their full $29,800 wage and forget about implement-
ing some protectionist measure.
The ratio of cost per job saved to average annual wage in the carbon steel
industry would lead a rational policymaker to reach the same conclusion.
Each job saved in this industry costs $750,000, and the average hourly wage
is $22.2l,"2 or $44,420 for a 2,000 hour work year. This conclusion does
not change at the lower end of the spectrum. For example, in the rubber
footwear industry, it costs $30,000 a year to save a job that pays only
$11,460 a year, based on a 2,000 hour work year.'27 Likewise, each job
saved in the lead and zinc industry cost $30,000 a year at a time when the
average wage was $3.28 an hour, or $6,560 for a 2,000 hour work year.'2
I am not saying that the government (taxpayers) should pay people not to
work, because that would be unfair to those who do work, but it is an
interesting comparison.
'25 Id. at 59.
126 Id. at 177.
127 Id. at 75. The cost per job saved in the fish industry was even lower-$21,000. The
annual or hourly wage for employees in this industry was not reported.
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'29 I used the more conservative 1.6 to 1 ratio from the Baughman and Emnich study ra-
ther than the much larger 3.1 to 1 ratio cited in the Denzau (1987) paper.130 From Table 1.
131 From Table 1.
132 Computed by multiplying the numbers in the Jobs Saved column by 1.6.
133 Computed by subtracting jobs lost from jobs saved.
134 The difference between jobs saved (981,138) and jobs lost (1,569,819).
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Thus, protectionism destroys at least 588,681 more jobs than it creates
each year. However, this figure is conservative because it includes only
direct job losses and ignores secondary losses. It also excludes industries
that have less than $100 million in annual volume. Also, the job loss/gain
ratio might be higher than the 1.6 to 1 used to compute net employment
losses in this example. Had we used the 3.1 to 1 ratio from the Denzau
paper, the number of jobs lost would have been 3,041,528 and the dead-
weight loss would have been 2,060,390.5 So it is reasonable to expect
the real net loss to be somewhat higher than 588,681.
B. Social Harmony Costs
Protectionism has a social harmony cost. It is a version of class conflict,
but rather than pitting the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, it is a conflict
of producers versus consumers. The producers seem to be winning, in the
sense that they are able to get their protectionist policies adopted by the
legislature, which is elected by the consumers.
But the situation is not hopeless. Although the special interest groups are
well financed and influential with the legislature, and the average consumer
is disinterested and powerless, in recent years various special interest groups
that stand to be harmed by protectionist measures have surfaced to do battle
with the special interest groups that are asking government for protection.
For example, in the auto industry, various auto dealerships which depend on
all or a substantial portion of their business from foreign imports banded
together to oppose a domestic content bill in 1982 and 1983.'3 This group
can exercise substantial influence if organized, and they were organized, by
manufacturer (Toyota, etc.). In 1982, there were 4,000 dealerships that sold
only imports, and there were 7,250 dealers that sold imports as well as
domestically made cars-1 1,250 in all-compared to 14,450 dealerships that
sold only domestic cars.13 7  The American International Auto Dealers
Association (AIADA) also joined in the fight against domestic content
legislation.
Other counterbalancing groups at times assert their views when special
interests call for protection. The International Longshoremen's Association
135 Jobs lost = 981,138 x 3.1 (jobs saved) = 3,041,528; Deadweight loss = 3,041,528 -
981,138 = 2,060,390.




opposed sugar quotas in the late 1970s. 3' Other groups that stand to lose
by restrictions on sugar imports, such as soft drink bottlers, ice cream
makers, and the Coalition to Resist Inflated Sugar Prices, have also been
vocal.' 39 Importers, represented by the American Association of Exporters
and Importers, have also made their views known."4 Destler and Odell
conducted a major study to determine which groups fought various
protectionist measures the hardest for a number of protectionist pieces of
legislation.' 4' The most vigorous opponents in these areas were:
Autos
American Honda Motor Co.
American International Auto Dealers Association
Auto Importers of America
Chamber of Commerce
Coalition of 22 associations
National Auto Dealers Association
Nissan Motor Corp., USA
Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc.
Copper
Chile, government of
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
Footwear
European Community
Footwear Retailers of America
South Korea, government of





South Korea, government of
'3 Id. at 50.
"9 Id. at 46.
'40 Id. at 50.
141 Id. at 143-74.
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Sugar
Consumers Against Sugar Hikes
Sugar Users Group
U.S. Cane Refiners Association
Textiles
American Association of Exporters and Importers
American Free Trade Council
China, government of
Hong Kong, government of
Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition
Wheat growers
Another negative aspect of protectionism, which reduces social harmony,
is the possibility of retaliation by a trading partner that feels it is being
punished or treated unfairly. Retaliation resulting from the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act caused the 1930s depression in the United States to deepen, and
the threat of retaliation still rears its ugly head from time to time.142
C. Reduced Choice
Another nonmonetary cost is the reduction in choice that results from
protectionist policies. Although this cost is intangible, it is a cost nonethe-
less. If consumers have to settle for their second or third choice, they lose
utility. The measure of this loss is the difference between what they would
have chosen had they been able to make their first choice, and the product
or service they must settle for because their first choice is unavailable, due
to some quota or tariff or other restriction.
D. Rights Violations
An often overlooked nonmonetary cost of protectionism is the reduction
in political and economic freedom that results when a government makes a
policy that results in reducing the number of contracts consenting adults are
able to enter into, or raising the cost of entering into such contracts. For
142 See Joseph P. Kalt, The Political Economy of Protectionism: Tariffs and Retaliation
in the Timber Industry, in TRADE PoLICY IssuEs AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIs 339-64 (Robert
E. Baldwin ed., 1988).
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example, if the price of a certain foreign auto is $2,000 more than it would
be in a free market, then government is forcing consumers to transfer $2,000
of their wealth to someone else, either to a domestic or a foreign producer,
as a condition of entering into a contract to purchase an auto. If an import
quota prevents consumers from even obtaining the automobile of their
choice, a property right is also violated, since property rights include the
right to trade the fruits of one's labor.
The ethics of this form of redistribution (as with any form of forced
redistribution) are also questionable.143 Tariffs and quotas are hidden
forms of redistribution. At least with a direct subsidy, the amount is
disclosed in the federal budget (unless it is an off-budget item). The extent
to which the consumers are subsidizing some special interest can be put in
terms of dollars and cents. Public servants who cry out for full disclosure
in any number of other areas say nothing about the morality of hiding the
cost of their protectionist actions from the voting public. They even go so
far as to argue that their actions are in the, public interest, to save jobs, etc.
V. CONCLUSION
Protectionism costs; it has both gainers and losers. Studies done in this
area are consistent in their conclusions that the losses exceed the gains, that
there is a deadweight loss, not only in terms of reduced standard of living
but in terms of employment as well. More jobs are lost than gained by
adopting a protectionist policy.
There are other costs as well. Besides the economic costs of higher prices,
reduced quality and choice, and lost jobs, protectionism also reduces social
harmony and results in property rights violations. Yet the United States and
other countries consistently adopt protectionist policies, usually at the behest
of the special interest groups that stand to gain by such policies, even though
the general population loses. Unless some good reason can be found for
adopting a protectionist policy, the logical conclusion seems to be that
protectionist policies should never be adopted because the losses exceed the
gains.
This is the conclusion that would be reached from a utilitarian perspec-
tive-the greatest good for the greatest number. 144 It can probably be said
143 See generally, BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952).
t4 For one of the classic works on this topic, see JoHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM
AND OTHER WRrrINGS (1962).
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that the majority of economists are utilitarians. But some are not. Some,
like Murray Rothbard, reject utilitarianism on moral grounds because
utilitarianism sometimes results in rights violations. 145 For rights theorists
like Rothbard, "the greatest good for the greatest number" is an irrelevant
argument. Rights theorists take the position that a particular policy is
acceptable, from a public policy perspective, if no one's rights are violated
and -unacceptable in all other cases."4 So the fact that a quota prevents
consenting adults from entering into contracts is a violation of rights. If the
sole purpose of government is to protect life, liberty and property, then any
policy that disparages any of these rights is illegitimate. 4 Since a quota
law disparages both property rights and the right to enter into contracts,
quotas are illegitimate abuses of governmental power. The fact that the
societal benefits may exceed the societal losses is irrelevant.
Another weakness of the utilitarian position is that utility is impossible to
measure.148 In the case of a protectionist policy, for example, the few
special interest groups-auto or textile manufacturers, etc.-benefit much,
while the vast majority of consumers are harmed a little. But there is no
way to measure individual gains and losses in terms of utility, so it is not
possible to determine whether the total gains from a particular policy exceed
145 For Rothbard's critiques of utilitarianism, see generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE
ETHIcs OF LEBERTY 10-11, 210-13 (1982); FOR A NEw LBERTY 15-16, 26-27, 30, 40 (1973);
MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 260-68 (1962).
"4 For an example of how a utilitarian and a rights theorist might reach different
conclusions for the same fact situation, let's examine the following scenario. Let's say that
John was just released from prison after ten years of incarceration. John has been a sex
maniac since he was eight years old and has not had sex since he went to prison. While
walking down a deserted street on his first night of freedom, he comes upon a prostitute who
is in a drunken stupor and rapes her. Because of her condition, she barely perceives what he
is doing, but she does manage to mumble that he should stop. For John, the experience was
the best thing that happened to him in ten years. For the prostitute, the experience was barely
perceived, and she actually fell asleep while it was in process. A utilitarian might conclude
that "society" benefits by the rape because John's benefit outweighs the prostitute's loss. A
rights theorist would argue that "societal" benefits and losses are completely irrelevant and
the only thing that matters is whether anyone's rights have been violated. Since the
prostitute's rights have been violated, the. rape is not to be condoned even if John's benefit
was immense and the prostitute's detriment was minor.
"4 Some philosophers would argue that the purpose of government should not be limited
to the defense of life, liberty and property, but should also extend to redistribution, taking
some people's property and giving it to others. For a moral critique of this view, see
generally DE JOUVENEL, supra note 143.




In the case of protectionism, it does not matter whether one takes the
utilitarian or natural rights approach, because the conclusion is the same,
although for different reasons. A policy that costs $135,000 a year for each
$12,000 job saved is a bad policy, even from a utilitarian perspective. 49
The policy is also bad from a natural rights perspective because the policy
violates the rights to property and freedom to contract. Thus, the only
conclusion to be drawn, from either a utilitarian or rights perspective, is that
protectionist policies are bad. Protectionism is not in the public interest and
any laws that support protectionism should be repealed, the sooner the better.
The law should favor neither producers nor consumers but should respect
property and contract rights.
"49 According to CLINE, supra note 53, at 194, it costs $134,686 annually to save a job
in the textile industry that pays $12,000 a year.
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